What happened?

While replacing a leaking header valve, it was determined that the faulty valve could not be removed without loosening the bolts on the downstream flange of an adjacent header valve (which was closed) to allow movement in the header log for the removal. As the bolts were loosened on the adjacent header valve, a release of trapped pressure resulted in an unplanned release of oil and gas.

The release was estimated to last 6 minutes. Slightly more than 1 barrel of oil and 108 kg of gas was estimated to be released.

What went wrong?

Due to the change in scope, work was performed on a system which had not been isolated and depressurized.

Why did it happen?

When the workers realized that the adjacent valve needed to be loosened to allow the header to be lifted to allow for the faulty valve to be removed/replaced the job scope changed and neither worker realized.

What areas were identified for improvement?

Job scope changed without proper assessment to additional hazards and controls. Tasks should be clearly defined and documented on a JSA and SWP. Any change in scope should be clearly communicated and approved.

All personnel working on or near isolated energy sources shall understand energy isolation requirements and procedures.

What will WE do to prevent this from happening HERE?

NOTICE: COS Safety Shares are based entirely on data voluntary reports by U.S. Operators and Contractors and you use it at your own risk. API has not verified the accuracy of reported data and makes no representation or warranty, either express or implied, or assumes any liability, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or utility of the information contained herein. API is not undertaking to meet the duties of employers, manufacturers, or suppliers to warn and properly train and equip their employees or others exposed to health and safety risks.